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~ April 13, 1984 
TATRO GINA-POW 
83-558 Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, et 
al. 
MEMO TO FILE 
This is one of my customary memos merely to serve as 
an aid in refreshing my recollection. 
The Facts 
Amber Tatro (Amber) is a five-year old female ---. 
suffering from a mal-functioning of the bladder known as 
spinal bifida. As a result of birth defects, Amber 
suffers from orthopedic and speech impediment as well as a 
"neuroganic bladder". She is unable to void voluntarily, 
and must be catheterized several times a day. The method 
is known as Clean Intermittent Catherization ("CIC"). 
The Tatros live in Independence School District, 
Texas, (School District). 
District undertook to 
At request of the parents, the 
provide Amber with special 
education, and recommended her for placement in a school 
district for Early Childhood Development classes. The 
School District developed an Individual Education Program 
for Amber that would provide the necessary educational and 
~ 
- - 2. 
therapeutic services, but declined to assume 
responsibility for paying for the CIC service. This 
resulted in the present litigation that commenced with a 
Hearing Officer, proceeded to the State Commissioner of 
Education, the State Board of Education (the latter agreed 
with the School District that there was no obligation to 
provide CIC) , and then to the District Court in Dallas 
before Judge Higginbotham. 
'Ille Statutes and the Litigation 
Respondents claim the right to free CIC service under 
the Education of All Handicappped Children Act (EAHCA), --and the Rehabilitation Act, and particularly §504 thereof. 
The specific issue is ~ C ~s "fr elated se~ 
within the meaning of §1401(17) of EAHCA. In the first of 
two DC decisions, Judge Higginbotham held that CIC is not 
"a related service", and therefore the School District is 
not required to furnish it. The DC considered the CIC a 
medical service not covered by the Act, as it was not a 
service related to education. 
CAS(opinion by Judge Goldberg) reversed the DC. 
Apparently, there was a misunderstanding as to whether a 
written stipulation of facts had been agreed upon. The CA 
was advised, following the DC's opinion, that it had acted 
• 
- - 3. 
under an erroneous assumption with respect to the 
stipulation. Thus, even the CA recognized that "there was 
no factual record upon which to base an opinion", it 
"nevertheless proceeded to address the merits of the 
cA&--
case". It held that the School District was obligated 
under both the EAHCA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
---------- -=-
Act to furnish ere. See, p. 4A of petition for cert. 
On remand, the DC - bound by CAS's ruling - held the 
School District libel to provide the CIC service. On 
appeal to CAS for the second time, the panel composed of 
Brown, Green and Jolly affirmed. 
stated: 
Curiously, this panel 
"Were we writing on a clean slate, we would 
share the District Court's reluctance to read a 
statute designed to aid education to require 
provision for medical necessities of life which 
are required by a ch i ld whether or not she 
participates in the state's educational program. 
Nevertheless, Tatro I was the authoritative 
intrepretation of EAHCA in this Circuit, and 
under 'law of the case' principles must be 
followed by us ... ". Petition for cert 67a, 
68a. 
We granted cert. 
The Parties Argue 
Petitioner, citing this Court's opinion in Penhurst I 
(WHR), emphasized that EACHA is a "funding statute" that 
- - 4. 
does not create a "federal right to education nor a 
federal right to free appropriate medical treatment in 
order to receive a 'free appropriate education'"· In 
accepting federal funds, the states do not undertake to 
provide particular methods for educating handicapped 
children. It is necessary under the Act for a state 
receiving funding to have a State Plan approved by the 
Secretary. The Texas Plan was approved, and did not 
include provision for delivery of medical treatment 
prescribed by a doctor. 
Petitioner argues that the effect of the decisions 
below is to "create a fe~eral right to medical treatment" 
even though EAHCA creates no federal right to an 
education. 
Respondents, for the most part, bases its argument on 
the plight of handicapped children in families financially 
unable to provide medical treatment. They also emphasize 
that CIC is a "related service" because without it Amber 
would be denied the benefits of the special education that 
the statute contemplates for handicapped children. 
Moreover, they point out - apparently correctly - that 
administering catheter i za tion of CIC is a simple process 
that can be performed by lay personnel - even though it is 
- - 5. 
related to a medical problem and is prescribed by a 
physician. 
There are several arnici briefs, although not as many 
as we usually have in cases of this kind. It is 
interesting to note that the DC and one panel of CAS would 
have decided this case against respondents, and yet the 
"law of the case" as it comes to us was decided by the 
Goldberg panel without the benefit of a record. 
LFP, JR. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Irving Independent School District v. Tatro 
No. 83-558 
/ 
David A. Charny April 12, 1984 
Question Presented 
1. Whether a school district may be required under the 
Education of All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) to provide 
"clean intermittent catheterization" to a handicapped student. 
2. Whether the attorney's provisions of the Rehabilita-
tion Act apply in suits that seek relief alternately under that 
Act and under the EAHCA. 
• 





A. Application of the EAHCA 
B. Attorney's Fees under §504 
III. Conclusion 
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I. Background 
The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
(EAHCA) provides monies to states and localities for the educa-
tion of the handicapped and establishes procedural and substan-
tive requirements for fund recipients. For each handicapped stu-
dent, the school district in cooperation with the parents must 
✓ 
formulate an "individualized education program" (IEP) that pro-
vides for instruction and "related services" to "meet the unique 
needs" of the handicapped child. 20 u.s.c. §1401(19). "Related 
services" include "developmental, corrective, and other support-----
ive services •.• as may be required to assist a handicapped 
to benefit from special education." Id. §1401(17). 
The EAHCA provides for judicial review of the parents' ---complaints about the IEP following exhaustion of administrative 
remedies mandated by the Act. §1415(e). The Act does not pro- '?t£> 
vide attorney's fees. In contrast, the Rehabilitation A~ that~~~ ~ 
----------- ---- ---------- - r-
generally prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in 
programs receiving federal financial assistance, was amended in 
1978 to grant attorney's fees to prevailing parties. 29 u.s.c. 
§794a. 
term 
The present case concernfl(he definition of 
"related services" a(J:?_he applicability of the 
the EAHCA 
Rehabilita-
tion Act's attorney's fees provision. Resps are parents of a 
child with spina bifida, a congenital defect that causes various 
neurological and orthopedic disorders. Among these, the child 
cannot empty her bladder except by insertion of a catheter. 
Catheterization must be performed several times daily. The 
IJC:111.,;11 mcmv; .l.LV.J.11';1 .l.llUt:t;Jt:llUt:IU .. ,;:)1.,;lJVV.L 1.1.J.oc;L.J.1.;c; v • .1.dLl.V J::Jd':::fl:: ':to - -
"clean intermittent catheterization" (CIC) procedure that the 
child uses need not be performed by a doctor or nurse, in aster-
ile environment or with sterile equipment. It is easily learned, 
and could be performed by the child when she reaches the age of 
eight or nine. 
Pursuant to the EAHCA, petr school district and resps 
developed an IEP. Because that plan did not provide for CIC, 
resps filed suit in the DC as provided by 20 u.s.c. §1415(c) (2). 
The
1
DC held that CIC was not a "related service" that could be 
required by an IEP adopted under the Act. The CA disagreed. CIC 
fell within the statutory language because the child could not 
attend classes at school without CIC. Such a construction did 
not expand the statutory definition to include all "life support" 
services, because it would apply only to services that were nec-
essary to allow the child to benefit from special education. 
services that could be provide outside of school would not be 
covered. Further, the Act requires that the state to the maximum 
~ 
J.J-c.. 
extent appropriate educate handicapped children with others not 
handicapped. 20 u.s.c. §1412(5). r elated serv~ thus in- I CA i 
- /n,.fUA./ 
eludes those required to permit handi ~ pped children to attend ~ 
,, _. ,, ,1 _ I _ (} school. ~
'" "' 
The CA also agreed with resps that §504 of the Rehabili- ~ \ 
tation Act, 29 u.s.c. §794, that prohibits discrimination against 
the handicapped in all programs that receive federal financial 
assistance, might require the school district to provide CIC. 
Refusal to provide the child with CIC would exclude the child 
• 
....,c; ll\.,11 JllC:lllV 9 .Ll.V.Lll';f .LUUtt::1-'tt::HUtt::lll. vl..,;11VV.J. LJ.L;:)l.l..Ll..,;l. V• .LdLl.U ~d':::I~ :..> • 
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from participation in school because of her handicap in violation 
of that section. 
On remand, the DC ordered the school to provide CIC and ---
awarded attorneys' fees under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. ~ 
The CA affirmed. The record showed that CIC was necessary to 
____, 64'~~-A_h) 
enable the child to attend school and could be performed by~~~• 
nurse or properly trained layman. Further, because the IEP~/1~ 
vided for attendance at school classes, CIC should have bet'enfn? ~ 
elude in the IEP. The CA also found itself be und ~ the pre~ iou~yr 
the case to uphold the attorneys' fees award based 4 C' 4 ~ s decision in ..._____... 
upon §504. 
II. Discussion 
A. Application of the EAHCA 
~~. 
The CA was correct in ruling that CIC is a "related 
~'™- - --
service" within the meaning of the EAHCA. CIC must be performed -at school if the student is to attend classes. Attendance of - ~ _ ___,_, --
classes is required by the IEP formulated by the parents and the 
school district and advances the Act's icy of enabling handi-
capped students as much as appropriate to attend classes with 
other children. See 20 u.s.c. §1412(5). 
~re~ i ~ ~ t a "medical s e rvice" that schools may not be 
required to provide under the Act, §1401(17). Neither the Act 
nor the legislative offer a definition of the terms. The Act, 
however, includes in its definition of "related services" serv-
ices, such as physical therapy, that are likely to be provided by 
a health care professional rather than a teacher. And the regu- 4? 
lations promulgated by HEW define "medical services" to mean ___, 
----=- -
.. • .. 
-
.._.,CJJ\.,.dJ JUC'IUV9 .L.L V.L.11';:1 .J.11UC1;:'CJJUC J Jl.. U\.,;lJVV.J. U.Li::tl..J. .L\.,;l.. V • ..L.Ql..1.V t,'0';1C V • 
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"services provided by a licensed physician," 34 CFR 300 .13 (b) ( 4), 
while defining "related services" to include "services provided 
by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person. These 
regulations draw a reasonable distinction as they apply in this 
case. Most schools probably would have a nurse available. The 
CIC procedure is safe, routine and virtually costless to a school 
that already has personnel available to perform it. For this 
reason, the Court need not decide in this case the extent to 
which more costly or dangerous procedures may be required to be 
performed by the school. There is no indication that the EAHCA ;,~ 
was intended to transform the schools into general provides of 
social and medical services for the handicapped. In some cases, 
factors such as cost or safety, as well as whether the service is 
performed by a physician, should be relevant to whether a service 
is a "medical service" that a school should not be required to 
perform. 
Nor should the Court hold that ~ the school was re-
quired to provide CIC or other related services rather than edu-
r 
cate a student at home or through special classes. This general 
question was not before the CA. Under Board of Education v. Row-
~ 103 S.Ct. 3034 (1982), the courts review the IEP "developed -through the Act's procedures" to determine whether the program is 
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits." Id., at 3051. It is apparent that the IEP as ini-
tially formulated did not meet that standard, as the student 
would have been unable to attend classes at all under the plan. 
Although petr would have been free to argue that the appropriate 
. \ 
, } 
ucuL;u mt:mu; .J..c. v .J.fl!j .J.naepenaenc ~cnoo.1. u1.s1:r 1.cc v. ·1·acro page ,. 
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remedy for resps' complaint was alternative placement rather than 
provision of CIC in the public schools, petr did not present this 
argument to the DC. As the CA found, therefore, the record con-
tains no support for petr's contention that this would have been 
an appropriate revision of the IEP. Thus, the Court's affirmance 
of the CA will imply no general requirement that the schools in 
all circumstances must provide CIC to children afflicted with 
spina bifida. 
respect. -
In this regard, the CA's reasoning was erroneous in one 
~ 
The CA wrongly held that "the standard of review devel-
oped in Rowley gives rise to a presumption in favor of the 
eductional placement established by [the] IEP." Petn. 76a. 
Rather, ~ owley establishes a presumption that the plan as a whole ~ 
is correct but says nothing about the appropriate remedy when the 
plan is found, as it was in this case, to be inadequate. Once a 
court determines that the plan is insufficient in one respect, it 
may prove that other aspects of the plan should be modified as 
well. In the first instance, the deference to local educational 
decisionmaking established in Rowley might call for deference to 
proposals for changing the IEP made by the school board. The CA 
arrived at the correct result in the present case, however, as 
the school board made no attempt to present to the DC an alterna-
tive remedy to that sought by the parents. . - . 
B. Attorney's Fees under §504 
When the EAHCA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act are 
"---' ------- -
alleged to confer the same substantive right upon a plaintiff, 
.., ------------------.... --------.... ----------------
~ EAHCA sb D.!!.!_d_ b_e_ ~ trued _ to provi~ the exclusive remedy f o.r---
• 
.,· 
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that right. Attorney's fees then would not be available to resps 
in the present case. 
The Court's cases clearly establish that when Congress 
has provided a detailed remedial scheme specifically to vindicate 
a right, a more general, background remedial provision is no 
longer applicable. See, e.g., efadlesex Cty. Sewerage Authority 
v. Sea Clammers, 453 u.s. 1, 20 (1981) (§1983 remedy no longer 
available); Great American Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Novotl.'}YJ 442 
U.S. 366, 376 (1979) (§1985(3) remedy) (citing also Brown v. GSA, --- --
425 u.s. 820). This inference is drawn even where the legisla-
tive history is entirely silent on the question of the relation 
between the two remedies. The rationale for the inference is 
that the general cause of action otherwise may enable l itigants 
to circumvent the more specific remedial provisions carefully 
considered by Congress. 
Although the Court has applied this principle as yet 
only to preclude suit under the Reconstruction Civil Rights stat-
utes, it is equally applicable to the relation between the Reha-
bilitation Act and the EAHCA. As a substantive matter, the EAHCA 
in the field of education confers the same rights -- if not more -
ex~ ghts -- as those conferred by §504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. -- The EAHCA is designed to guarantee handicapped chil-··! dren "equal access" to education. Rowley, 102 S.Ct., at 3047. 
Similarly, §504 provides for "evenhanded treatment" of the handi-
capped by fed.erally funded programs. Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397. 411 (1979). The EAHCA may go far-
ther than the Rehabilitation Act in that it contemplates specific 
uit:::111..:11 m~mu: .Lrving .Lnaepenaenc .:,cnoo.L u1.scr1cc v. Tacro page ':1. - -
affirmative steps by school administrators to educate the handi-
capped. In any event, it seems clear, as the Dept. of HEW has 
indicated in its regulations under §504, 34 CFR 104.33{b) (2), 
that an educational program that is in compliance with the EAHCA 
complies with §504 as well. 
There is then no substantive reason to preserve the §504 
cause of action in cases governed by the EAHCA. And the right of 
action under the Rehabilitation Act could undermine the specific /~T ___. 
--. 
remedial scheme established by the EAHCA. The EAHCA creates an 
elaborate system of administrative . remedies, whose purpose is to 
protect the primary responsibility of local officials and parents 
to set educat i"Onal policies and ·standards; and the IEP substan-
tively is reviewed under a deferential standard. See Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 102 s.ct., at 3051-3052. In contrast, it is 
unclear whether plaintiffs under the Rehabilitation Act must 
first exhaust state remedies. Compare Fells v. Brooks, 552 F. 
Supp. 30 {DDC 1981); Sanders v. Marquette Public Schools, 561 F. 
Supp. 1361 {WD Mich 1983) {no exhaustion), with Turillo v. Tyson, 
535 F. Supp. 577 {DRI 1982) {exhaustion required). And the Reha-
bilitation Act makes no provision for deference to state deci-
sionmaking. 
Further, the recent proliferation of attorney's fees 
provisions in federal statutes suggests that the omission of such 
a provision fo~ EAHCA actions was not mere oversight. To require 
local school districts to pay for attorneys throughout the 
lengthy process of administrative and judicial review would im-
pose an enormous burden upon them. If the omission of an attor-
,_,Cll'-11 lllCUlVo .Ll.V.Lll';l .LllUC~CllUClll. O\jllVV.L U.LO:,l.J..L\jl. Vo .LQl.J.V J:-'0':::jl:: .LVo 
- -
ney's fees provision indicates an affirmative congressional deci-
sion not to subsidize these suits, that decision should not be 
nullifed by the general language of the Rehabilitation Act, that 
was passed without any intent to alter the more specific provi-
sions of the EAHCA. 
If the Court holds that §504 remedies are not avail-
able to obtain relief available under the EAHCA, the Court need 
not consider the issue whether §504 would require petr to provide 
CIC to resp's child. That issue is difficult. Southeastern Com-
munity College suggests that affirmative steps that did not im-
pose "undue financial and administrative burdens" might be re-
quired to accommodate the handicapped. 442 U.S., at 412. That 
case, however, addressed a request that the college alter the 
substantive requirements imposed uopn all students, rather than 
provide a special service for a particular student. More funda-
mentally, it is difficult to articulate a meaningful standard by 
which to decide what accommodations impose "undue" burdens. That 
standard, that involves the allocation of scarce educational re-
sources, should be made legislatively, by Congress or the local 
school boards. §504 itself provides no guidance on the issue, 
the legislative history of that section does not mention the 
problem, and the Court correctly questioned in Southeastern Com-
munity College the extensive reach that the Dept. of HEW had at-
tempted to give to the statute. The absence of any clear stand-
ard under §504 again suggests that the Court should hold that the 
EAHCA exclusively governs judicial review of any educational de-
cision that is within the scope of that Act. 
u1:;:111.,;u 1111::IIIU; .i.1.V.i.11\j .i.IlUt!t't!llUt!Ill: .::>L:UUO.l. JJl.Sl:I:"l.Cl: Vo TaCI:"O page .l..l.o 
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III. Conclusion 
The CA interpretation of the EAHCA should be affirmed; 
its award of attorney's fees should be reversed. 
• 
• 
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Cert to CAS (Brown, Gee, 
Jolly) --
TATRO, HENRI, ET UX. Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: school's failure to provide clean 





ndicapped Children Act (EAHCA) and/or the 
BELOW: Amber Tatro, who is by now 
is a female child born with spina bifida. As 
\-MJ ~ ~ci<&bal IZw.t \J,'b01~ No, 'l~-~la~ - ~ ~ 
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a result of this congenital defect, Amber suffers from orthopedic 
and speech handicaps and from a neurogenic bladder. The latter 
condition prevents her from emptying her bladder voluntarily, and 
\ thus she must be catheterized every 3 or 4 hours to prevent 
~ff 
chronic kidney infection. The method chosen by Amber's doctors, 
the most widely accepted method, is Clean Intermittent 
Catheterization (CIC). The procedure is a relatively simple one, 
involving the insertion of a clean catheter into the bladder to 
allow proper drainage. It can be performed by a layperson after 
minimal training, and Amber will be able to do it by herself when 
she is 8 or 9 years old. Appendix at 97a n.3. 
In 1979 when Amber was about 3 1/2 years old, resps, her 
parents, asked petr, the Irving Independent School District, to 
provide special education for her. After a series of meetings, 
the School District developed an Individual Education Program 
(IEP) for Amber as required by the EAHCA. The IEP provided for 
Amber's placement in the School District's Early Childhood 
Development (ECD) classes and for the provision of other services 
for Amber, including physical and occupational therapy. The IEP 
did not provide for CIC, and the School District maintained that 
it had no legal obligation to do so. 
Resps pursued administrative review of the School District's 
failure to provide CIC, and eventually brought an action in 
federal district court pursuant to 20 u.s.c. §1416(e) (2). Resps 
argued that the School District had failed to provide Amber with 
a "free appropriate education," which is defined in the EAHCA to 
~
include both "special education and related services." 20 u.s.c. 
~ ~~
' . - - 3. 
§1401 (18). Specifically, they argued that CIC is a "related 
service" under the EAHCA. They also argued that 
provide CIC is a violation of section 504 of the 
Act which prohibits discrimination against the 
federally funded programs. 29 U.S.C. §794. 
the failure to , J-Jv 
Rehabilitation ·~ 
~ 
handicapped in \ a.,; 
The DC (Higginbotham, DJ) rejected resp's arguments. He 
first examined the EAHCA claim, where the issue is whether CIC is 
a II 
20 
elated se 1:.__v ic?'Y That term is defined as follows: 
:::::------ ------- - - ...------ /~~ 
""The term ~ --Chser ':__i~~ • 
transportation,  elopmental, 
means 
corrective, and other supportive services 
(including speech pathology and audiology, 
psychological services, physical and occupational 
therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling 
services, except that such medical services shall 
be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as 
may be required to assist a handicapped person to 
benefit from special education, and includes the 
early identification and assessment of 
handicapping conditions in children." 
U.S.C. §1401(17). The DJ concluded that the "related 
services" statute contains only 2 categories: 1) transportation 
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special 
education, and 2) supportive s~rvices required to assist a 
I 
handicapped child to benefit form special education. Category 1 
is clearly inapplicable here, and category 2 is also inapplicable 
because CIC is not a "supportive service" directly related to 
Amber's ability to benefit from her special education; she will 
require CIC whether or not she is attending school. Although it 
is essential to Amber's life, once it is provided, it is 
unrelated to her learning skills. Also if the procedure could be 
classified as a "medical service," it clearly would not fit 
' . 
~ 
- - 4. 
within the statute because it is not for "diagnostic and 
evaluation purposes." 
The DJ also rejected resps' argument that the regulations 
implementing the EAHCA indicate that CIC qualifies as a "related 
service." The regulations state that "related services" include 
"school health services," 45 C.F.R. §12la.13(a), and they define 
"school heal th services" as "services provided by a qualified 
school nurse or other qualified person." 45 C.F.R. 
§12la.13(b) (10). The DJ concluded that the regulation read in 
its entirety is consistent with the foregoing interpretation of 
the statute and simply requires the provision of "school health 
services" which are directly related to the effort to educate. 
The DJ also rejected resps' claim under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act. That section provides: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his 
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving federal assistance." 
29 u.s.c. §794. The DJ concluded that a statute aimed at 
preventing discrimination in certain governmental programs could 
not be converted into a statute requiring the "setting up of 
governmental health care for people seeking to participate in 
such programs." 
On appeal CA5 in Tatro I reversed the DJ's interpretation of 
------ -both statutes and remanded for further factual findings. As to 
the EAHCA claim, CA5 concluded that CIC fits within a literal 
interpretation of the statutory definition of "related services." 
- - 5. 
It is a supportive service required to assist Amber to benefit 
from her special education program because without it, she can 
not be present in the classroom at all. CA5 noted that its 
interpretation of the statute would not require schools to 
furnish every necessary life support service because the EAHCA 
itself contained limitations. First, a child has to be 
handicapped 
qualify for 
so as to require special education 
any services at all. Second, the 
in order to 
life support 
service must be necessary to aid the child to benefit from the 
special education to be provided. For example, if the life 
support service did not need to be performed during school hours 
(e.g., a once-a-day insulin shot), it would not be a "related 
service." Third, pursuant to the implementing regulation, in 
order for the life support service to be a "related service," it 
must be one that can be performed by a nurse or other qualified 
person. 
As to the Rehabilitation Act claim, CA5 concluded that the 
failure of the school to provide CIC will result in the exclusion 
of Amber from the school's ECD program, and that that exclusion 
violates section 504. CA5 rejected petr 's argument that 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), 
dictates a contrary result. CA5 concluded that the Court in that 
case held only that section 504 does not require a school to 
provide services to a handicapped person for a program for which 
the person's handicap precludes him ever from realizing the 
principal benefits of the training. Here, with the provision of 
- - 6. 
CIC, Amber will be able fully to benefit from the school's ECD 
program. 
On remand for appropriate factual findings, addressing the 
EAHCA claim, the DJ found that Amber was a child entitled to 
special education, that CIC must be performed during school 
hours, and that under Texas law, CIC could be performed by a 
nurse or a qualified person in accordance with a valid medical 
prescription. With all 3 prerequisites of Tatro I satisfied, the 
DJ ordered the School District to provide CIC for Amber. Turning 
to the section 504 claim, the DJ noted that he had to reach that 
claim because resps were seeking attorneys fees and that the 
Rehabilitation Act, but not the EAHCA, provided for fees. See 29 
'-
u. s .c. §749a(b). The DJ quite obviously disagreed with CA5's 
decision that resps stated a claim under section 504 and 
explicitly noted that his reading of Southeastern, reenforced by 
the intervening decision of this Court in Pennhurst State School 
and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), made CA5's result 
questionable. Nonetheless, he felt bound by the decision and 
awarded resps attorneys fees. 
The School District then appealed, and CA5 rendered its 
Tatro II decision. The new CA5 panel expressed much reluctance on 
the EAHCA issue, but recognized Tatro I as the law of the case. 
It also expressed doubt that the Rehabilitation Act imposed any 
affirmative obligations on school districts, but felt that 
Pennhurst was not so clear as to require departure from the 
decision of the prior panel. 
- - 7. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that CA5 erred in interpreting 
"related services" in the EAHCA to include CIC. It recognized 
that the only other circuit to address the issue agreed with CAS, 
and that this Court denied cert in the case. Pennsylvania 
Department of Education v. Tokarcik, 665 F. 2d 443 (CA3 1981), 
cert. denied, 102 s. Ct. 3508 (1982). Petr argues that this case 
is distinguishable because all the parties here have stipulated 
that CIC is "medical treatment" and that that designation makes 
it an even clearer case for noninclusion within the statutory 
language. Petr argues that CA5's decision is in conflict with 
Pennhurst and with Board of Education v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 
(1982), and that it will open the floodgates and lead to the 
imposition of all sorts of medical treatment obligations on 
school districts. Petr barely makes mention of CA5's 
Rehabilitation Act holding, but does argue that it is erroneous 
in light of Southeastern, Rowley, and Pennhurst. Two amici, the 
National School Boards Association and the Texas Association of 
School Boards, make similar arguments in support of petr. 
Resps argue that the decision in Tatro II is correct under 
the language of the EAHCA and cons is tent with the only other 
circuit to address the issue. They argue that the section 504 
issue is also correct and consistent with all of the post-
Southeastern circuit court decisions. They also argue that the 
impact of the decision is slight given the small number of 
children with spina bifida and given CA5's explicit limitations 
on the kind of life support services that the school districts 
must provide. The parties' stipulation that CIC is "medical 
- - 8. 
treatment" has no legal significance. The decision is not in 
conflict with Rowley; in fact the Court held the cert petition in 
Tokarcik until after Rowley was decided and simply denied it 
rather than remanding for reconsideration in light of Rowley. 
4. DISCUSSION: As to the EAHCA issue, I tend to believe 
that DJ's original interpretation/ of the statute is correct, 
CAS's -. ..._ limiting_ langua_ge does mitigate the burden on 
schools ~'f its otherwise sweeping holding. Al though CAS may be 
in error, there is no circuit conflict, and resps are correct 
that the Court denied the cert petition in Tokarcik after Rowley 
was dee ided. Furthermore, resps properly point out a possible 
problem in taking this case, a problem which was also present in 
Tokarcik. Because Amber will be able to perform CIC by herself 
apparently in the near future, there is an argument that the case 
mip t be moot by the time the Court could consider it. 
The Rehabilitation Act issue presents an important question 
in my view, although petrs do not seem nearly so interested in 
it. To find a violation of section 504 here, first you must 
assume that that act imposes some af:f irmative obligation on 
I 
schools and also that there is · a private cause of action to 
~v~ enforce those obligadons (a question which the Court reserved in 
~~Southeastern). The Rehabili ta_t ; on Act is by its own terms an 
~ anti-discrimination act, .and , in · Southeastern the Court clearly 
~ recognized a distinction between the obligation to treat 
qualified handicapped persons even-handedly in federally funded 
programs and the obligation to make affirmative efforts in 
administering those programs to overcome the disabilities caused 
, . - - 9. 
by handicaps. In my view (and apparently in the view of the DJ 
and the Tatro I I panel) , Southeastern and the Court's more 
recent comments in Pennhurst create a substantial question as to 
whether section 504 does impose any such affirmative obligations. 
In Pennhurst the Court stated: 
"Relying on that distinction [the distinction 
between congressional encouragement of state 
programs and the imposition of binding obligations 
on states], this Court in Southeastern Community 
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), rejected a 
claim that §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
which bars discrimination against handicapped 
persons in federally funded programs, obligates 
schools to take affirmative steps to eliminate 
problems raised by an applicant's hearing 
disability. Finding that 'state agencies such as 
Southeastern are only "encouraged .•• to adopt and 
implement such policies and procedures,"' id., at 
410 (quoting the Act), we stressed that 'Congress 
understood [ that] accommodation of the needs of 
handicapped individuals may require affirmative 
action and knew how to provide for it in those 
instances where it wished to do so.' Id., at 411." 
451 U.S., at 27. See also University of Texasv. Camenisch, 451 
U.S. 390, 399 (BURGER, C.J., concurring). Although the circuit 
courts considering the issue appear to be reaching results 
consistent with CA5 here, in reaching those results, all the 
courts express confusion as to the meaning of Southeastern and 
how to distinguish it. See, e.g., Tatro I and II; New Mexico 
Association for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847 
(CAl0 1982); Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 649-53 (CA2 
1982). The Court's Pennhurst dicta may well indicate that the 
attempts to distinguish Southeastern are erroneous. See also 
Smith v. Cumberland School Committee, 703 F.2d 4, 9 (CAl 1983), 
cert. granted sub nom. Smith v. Robinson, No. 82-2120. 
' • - - 10. 
Thus I think that there is a good argument that both of the 
issues in this case were wrongly decided. Accordingly, I think 
that both issues are potentially certworthy even though there are 
no circuit conflicts yet. The EAHCA issue, however, is fairly 
r---
n a r row. ·':_:._n~o=--t~~1::_· n~_c::._o~n_:::f_:::1::..:1::..· c=...=t _ w:.:..::.i .::.t :.:.h:...-=a=n=--y.__...::d;:.;e::..c:::...=.i -=s-=i:..::o:.:n~..:.o~f=--t=--:h.=i .=s_ Co u r t , and .........-...__ 
suffers from a possible mootness problem. The Rehabilitation Act 
issue on the other hand presents a broader question of the 
overall purpose of the Act, is arguably in conflict with 
decisions of this Court, and I suppose would not present the same 
mootness concerns because of the attorneys fees aspect of the 
case. Of course there is a chance that the Pennhurst dicta will ._______ 
clear up the confusion in the lower courts' interpretations of 
Southeastern, but at some point I think that the Court will have 
to address the Rehabilitation Act issue. I note that the Court 
has already granted cert in a Rehabilitation Act case, and that 
case may have some bearing on the issue here. In Smith v. 
Robinson, No. 82-2120, the Court will decide whether, if 
plaintiffs prevail under the EAHCA, they can collect attorneys 
fees under the Rehabilitation Act or under §1988, even though the 
DC did not address their identical claims under those laws. If 
the Court reaches the attorneys fees question under the 
Rehabilitation Act in Smith, it may well discuss the nature of 
the obligations and the private cause of action, if any, under 
that Act. LJ ~ 0-c,{ ~ ~ ~  ~ ~ ~jJJ 
b ~ Thus, assuming that the Court is troubled .---..-
Rehabilitation Act issue here and sees no need to wait for a 
conflict, I recommend at a minimum a hold for Smith. If that 
. -... 
.. 
- - 11 • 
case does not address the Rehabilitation Act issue with 
sufficient clarity, the Court could grant this petition after 
Smith is decided. If the Court is equally interested in the EAHCA 
issue, and not troubled by the possible mootness problem, it 
could grant the petition now on both issues and perhaps consider 
this case with the Smith case. 
There is a response, and there are two amici petitions in 
support of petr. 
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April 19, 1984 
Re: 83-558 - Irving Independent School 
District v. Tatro (~J-c.-C~S--~ 
O'z,._ c:P ~~ UtLA' ~ 
Dear Chief: o- ('."'--,c;(tiwrr ~(CIC) 
£,-1- · · ~ ~~'') 
Prior to conference I did not focus on the / 
attorneys' fees question. After reviewing the 
certiorari petition, I have concluded that the fee 
issue is as not really here. The questions presented 
in the cert. petition are: 
"l. Whether 'medical treatment' such as 
clean intermitten chaterization is a 'related 
service' required under the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act and, therefore, 
required to be provided to the minor 
responoent. 
"2. Is a public school required to 
provide and perform the medical treatment 
prescribed by the physician of a handicapped 
child by the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act or the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973? 
"3. Whether the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals misconstrued the opinions of this 
Court in Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, and State Board of Education v. 
Rowley." 
I do not read any of these questions as putting at 
issue anything but ihe injunction requiring the school 
district to provide CIC. I do not think that they 
fairly present the question whether the school district 
is liable for attorneys' fees under the Rehabilitation 
Act. Since we have answered the first question 
presented (and the EAHCA aspect of the second question, 
\ - -
-2-
to the extent it differs from the first) affirmatively, 
that would seem to be sufficient to support entry of 
the injunction without reliance on the Rehabilitation 
Act. 
Since I read the questions presented in the 
petition to place only the injunction requiring 
provision of CIC to Amber at issue, my vote is to 
affirm under the EAHCA only, and not to reach any 
question under the Rehabilitation Act. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to tbe- Conference 
~) 
fully, 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83--558 ~~ 
IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
PETITIONER v. HENRI TATRO, ET ux., 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF 
~I 
~
AMBER TATRO, A MINOR ~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT (J '---
4J ~ 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Education 
of the Handicapped Act or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 re-
quires a school district to provide a handicapped child with 
clean intermittent catheterization during school hours. 
I 
Amber Tatro is an eight-year-old girl born with a defect 
known as spina bifida. As a result, she suffers from orthope-
dic and speech impairments and a neurogenic bladder, which 
prevents her from emptying her bladder voluntarily. Con-
sequently, she must be catheterized every three or four 
hours to avoid injury to her kidneys. In accordance with ac-
cepted medical practice, clean intermittent catheterization 
(CIC), a procedure involving the insertion of a catheter into 
the urethra to drain the bladder, has been prescribed. The 
procedure is a simple one that may be performed in a few 
minutes by a layperson with less than an hour's training. 
Amber's parents , babysitter, and teenage brother are all 
qualified to administer CIC, and Amber soon will be able to 




2 IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. v. TATRO 
In 1979 petitioner Irving Independent School District 
agreed to provide special education for Amber, who was then 
three and one-half years old. In consultation with her par-
ents, who are respondents here, petitioner developed an indi-
vidual education program for Amber under the requirements 
of the Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175, as 
amended significantly by the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 773, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1401(19), 
1414(a)(5). The individual education program provided that 
Amber would attend early childhood development classes and 
receive special services such as physical and occupational 
therapy. That program, however, made no provision for 
school personnel to administer CIC. 
Respondents unsuccessfully pursued administrative reme-
dies to secure CIC services for Amber during school hours. 1 
In October 1979 respondents brought the present action in 
District Court against petitioner, the State Board of Educa-
tion, and others. See 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(2). They sought 
an injunction ordering petitioner to provide Amber with CIC 
and sought compensatory damages and attorney's fees. 
First, respondents invoked the Education of the Handi-
capped Act. Because Texas received funding under that 
statute, petitioner was required to provide Amber with a 
"free appropriate education," 20 U. S. C. §§ 1412(1), 1414(a) 
(l)(C)(ii), which is defined to include "related services," 
§ 1401(18). Respondents argued that CIC is one such "re-
lated service." 2 Second, respondents invoked § 504 of the 
1 The Education of the Handicapped Act's procedures for administrative 
appeal are set out in 20 U. S. C. § 1415. In this case a hearing officer 
ruled that the Education of the Handicapped Act did require the school to 
provide CIC, and the Texas Commissioner of Education affirmed. The 
State Board of Education reversed, holding that CIC was a medical service 
falling outside the obligation the Act imposed on school districts. 
2 As discussed more fully later, the Education of the Handicapped Act 
defines "related services" to include "supportive services (including ... 
medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be 
for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a 
- -
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 
U. S. C. § 794, which forbids an individual, by reason of a 
handicap, to be "excluded from the participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under" any 
program receiving federal aid. 
The District Court denied respondents' request for a pre-
liminary injunction. 481 F. Supp. 1224 (ND Tex. 1979). 
That court concluded that CIC was not a "related service" 
under the Education of the Handicapped Act because it did 
not serve a need arising from the effort to educate. It also 
held that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not require "the 
setting up of governmental health care for people seeking to 
participate" in government programs. Id., at 1229. 
The Court ppeals reversed. 625 F. 2d 557 (CA5 1980) 
(Tatro I._J>-_ ........... ,,.,, it held that CIC was a "related service" 
under 602 f the Education of the Handicapped ltct , 20 
U. S. 401(17), because without the procedure Amber 
could not attend classes an ene t from special education. 
~ titioner's refusal to provide CIC effec-
excluded her from a federally funded educational pro-
gram in violation of 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The 
Court of Appeals remanded or the istrict ourt to develop 
a factual record and apply these legal principles. 
On remand petitioner stressed the Education of the Handi-
capped Act's explicit provision that "medical services" could 
qualify as "related services" only when they served the pur-
pose of diagnosis or evaluation. See n. 2, supra. The Dis-
trict Court held that under Texas law a nurse or other quali-
fied person may administer CIC without engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of medicine, provided that a doctor 
prescribes and supervises the procedure. The District 
Court then held that, because a doctor was not needed to ad-
minister CIC, provision of the procedure wasnot a "medical 
service" for purposes of the Education of the Handicapped 
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Act. Finding CIC to be a "related service" under that Act, 
the District Court ordered petitioner to modify Amber's indi-
vidual education program to include provision of CIC during 
school hours. It also awarded compensatory damages 
against petitioner and the State Board of Education. 3 516 
F. Supp. 968 (ND Tex. 1981). 
On the authority of Tatro I, the District Court then held 
that respondents had proved a violation of § 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act. Although the District Court did not rely on 
this holding to authorize any greater injunctive or compensa-
tory relief, it did invoke the holding to award attorney's fees 
against petitioner and the State Board of Education. 4 The 
Rehabilitation Act, unlike the Education of the Handicapped 
Act, authorizes prevailing parties to recover attorney's fees. 
See 29 U. S. C. § 794a. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 703 F. 2d 823 (CA5 1983) 
(Tatro II). That court accepted the District Court's conclu-
sion that state law permitted qualified persons to administer 
CIC without the physical presence of a doctor, and it af-
firmed the award of relief under the Education of the Handi-
capped Act. In affirming the award of attorney's fees based 
on a finding of liability under the Rehabilitation Act, the 
Court of Appeals found no change of circumstances since 
Tatro I that would justify a different result. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1983), and we af-
firm in part and reverse in part. 
_....._____--= =--
3 The District Court dismissed the claims against all defendants other 
than petitioner and the State Board, though it retained the members of the 
State Board "in their official capacities for the purpose of injunctive relief." 
516 F. Supp. 968, 972-974 (ND Tex. 1981). 
' In denying a later motion to amend the judgment, the District Court 
held that§ 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794a, which author-
izes attorney's fees as a part of a prevailing party's costs, abrogated the 
State Board's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 56a-60a. The State Board did not petition for certiorari, 
and the Eleventh Amendment issue is not before us. 
- -
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II 
This case poses two separate issues. Th~ is whether 
the Education of th~ Act requires etitioner to 
provide CIC services to Amber. T secon is whether 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act creates sue an obligation. 
We first turn to the claim presented under the Education of 
the Handicapped Act. 
States receiving funds under the Act are obliged to satisfy 
certain conditions. A primary condition is that the state im-
plement a policy "that assures all handicapped children the 
right to a free appropriate eduation." 20 U. S. C. § 1412(1). 
Each educational agency applying to a state for funding must 
provide assurances in turn that its program aims to provide 
"a free appropriate education to all handicapped children." 
§ 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii). 
A "free appropriate education" is explicitly defined as "spe-
cial education and related services." § 1401(18). 5 The term 
"special education" means 
"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or 
guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped 
child, including classroom instruction; instruction in 
physical education, home instruction, and instruction in 
os itals and institutions." § 1401(16). 
"Related services' are defined as 
.ransportation, and such developmental, corrective, 
and other supportive services (including speech pathol-
ogy and audiology, psychological services, physical and 
occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and coun-
seling services, except that such medical services shall be 
5 Specifically, the "special education and related services" must 
"(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educa-
tional agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or second-
ary school education in the State involved, and (D) [be] provided in con-
formity with the individualized education program required under section 
1414(a)(5) of this title." § 1401(18). 
- -
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for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be 
required to assist a handicapped person to benefit from 
special education, and includes the early identification 
and assessment of handicapping conditions in children." 
§ 1401(17) (emphasis added). 
The issue in this case is whether CIC · a" el ted service" 
th t petitioner is obliged to rovide to Amber. We must an-
swer wo quest10ns: rs , wnether 1 'supportive serv-
ic[e] ... required to assist a handicapped person to benefit 
from special education"; and second, whether CIC is excluded 
from this definition as a "medical servic[e]" serving purposes 
other than diagnosis or evaluation. 
A 
The Court of Appeals was clearly correct in holding that 
CIC is a "supportive servic[e] ... required to assist a handi-
capped person to benefit from special education." 6 It is 
clear on this record thatAwithout having CIC services avail-
able during the school day, Amber cannot attend school and 
thereby· "benefit from special education." CIC services 
therefore fall squarely within the definition of a "supportive 
service." 7 
6 Petitioner claims that courts deciding cases arising under the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act are limited to inquiring whether a school dis-
trict has followed the requirements of the state plan and has followed the 
Act's procedural requirements. However, we held in Henrick Hudson 
District Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 206, n. 27 (1982), 
that a court is required "not only to satisfy itself that the State has adopted 
the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act, but also to de-
termine that the State has created an IEP for the child in question which 
conforms with the requirements of§ 1401(19) [defining an IEP]." Judicial 
review is equally appropriate in this case, which presents the legal ques-
tion of a school's substantive obligation under the "related services" re-
quirement of § 1401(17). 
; The Department of Education has agreed with this reasoning in an in-
terpretive ruling that specifically found CIC to be a "related service." 46 
Fed. Reg. 4912 (1981). Accord Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 
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As we have stated before, "Congress sought primarily to 
make public education available to handicapped children" and 
"to make such access meaningful." Henrick Hudson District 
Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 192 (1982). A 
service that enables a handicapped child to remain at school 
during the day is an important means of providing the child 
with the meaningful access to education that Congress envi-
sioned. The Act makes specific provision for services, like 
transportation, for example, that do no more than enable a 
child to be physically present in class, see 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1401(17); and the Act makes specific grants for schools to al-
ter buildings and equipment to make them accessible to the 
handicapped,§ 1406. See Sen. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 38 (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 19,484 (1975) (remarks of 
Sen. Stafford). Services like CIC that permit a child to re-
main at school during the day are no less related to the effort 
to educate than are services that enable the child to reach, 
enter, or exit the school. 
We h~d that CIC services in this case qualify as a "sup-
portive service . . . required to assist a handicapped person 
to benefit from special education." 8 
B 
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that provision of 
CIC is n()t a "~di~e]," which a school is required to 
provide oniyTor purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. See 20 
effective date of this interpretive ruling, see 46 Fed. Reg. 12,495 (1981); id. 
at 18,975, and later postponed it indefinitely, id. at 25,614. But the De-
partment presently does view CIC services as an allowable cost under the 
Act. Ibid. 
8 The obligation to provide special education and related services is ex-
pressly phrased as a "conditio[n]" for a State to receive funds under the 
Act. See 20 U. S. C. § 1412; see also Sen. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong. , 1st 
Sess. , 16 (1975). This refutes petitioner's contention that the Act did not 
"impos[e] an obligation on the States to spend state money to fund certain 
rights as a condition of receiving federal moneys" but "spoke merely in 
precatory terms," Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 
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U. S. C. § 1401(17). We begin with the regulations of the 
Department of Education, which are entitled to deference. 9 
See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 141 (1982).mall <:...___ 
~TaUman, 380 U. 8. 1, 16 (1965}. The regulations define 
"related services" for handicapped children to include "school 
health services," 34 CFR § 300.13(a) (1983), which are de-
fined in turn as "services provided by a qualified school nurse 
or other qualified person," § 300.13(b)(10). "Medical serv-
ices" are defined as "services provided by a licensed physi-
cian." § 300.13(b)(4). 10 Thus, the Secretary has determined 
that the services of a school nurse otherwise qualifying as a 
"related service" are not subject to exclusion as a "medical 
service," but that the services of a physician are excludable 
as such. 
This definition of "medical services" is a reasonable inter-
pretation o congress10na mtent. lt ough Congress de-
voted~medical services" exclusion, the 
Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was de-
signed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a serv-
ice that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the 
range of their competence. 11 From this understanding of 
• The Secretary of Education is empowered to issue such regulations as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1417(b). This function was initially vested in the Commissioner of Edu-
cation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, who promul-
gated the regulations in question. This function was transferred to the 
Secretary of Education when Congress created that position, see Depart-
ment of Education Organization Act, §§ 301(a)(l), (2)(H), 93 Stat. 677 
(1979). 
10 The regulations actually define only those "medical services" that are 
owed to handicapped children: "services by a licensed physician to deter-
mine a child's medically related handicapping condition which results in the 
need for special education and related services." 34 CFR § 300.13(b)(4) 
(1983). Presumably this means that "medical services" not owed under 
the statute are those "services by a licensed physician" that serve other 
purposes. 
11 Children with serious medical needs are still entitled to an education. 
For example, the Act specifically includes instruction in hospitals and at 
- -
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congressional purpose, the Secretary could reasonably have 
concluded that Congress intepded to impose the obligation to 
provide school nursing services. 
Congress plainly required schools to hire various specially 
trained personnel to help handicapped children, such as 
"occupational therapists, speech therapists, psychologists, 
social workers, and other appropriate trained personnel." 
Sen. Rep. No. 168, supra, at 33. School nurses have long 
been a part of the educational system, and the Secretary 
could therefore reasonably conclude that school nursing serv-
ices are not the sort of burden that Congress intended to ex-
clude as a "medical service." By limiting the "medical serv-
ices" exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital, both 
far more expensive, the Secretary has given a permissible 
construction to the provision. 
Petitioner's contrary interpretation of the "medical serv- i 
ices" exclusion is unconvincing. In petitioner's view, CIC is 
a "medical ·service;'evefi though it may be provided by a 
nurse or trained layperson; that conclusion rests on its read-
ing of Texas law that confines CIC to uses in accordance with 
a physician's prescription and under a physician's ultimate su-
perv1s10n. Aside from conflicting with the Secretary's rea-
sonable interpretation of congressional intent, however, such 
a rule would be anomalous. Nurses in petitioner's school 
district are authorized to dispense oral medications and ad-
minister emergency injections in accordance with a physi-
cian's prescription. This kind of service for nonhandicapped 
children is difficult to distinguish from the provision of CIC to 
the handicapped. 12 It would be strange indeed if Congress, 
home within the definition of "special education." See 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1401(16). 
12 Petitioner attempts to distinguish the administration of prescription 
drugs from the administration of CIC on the ground that Texas law ex-
pressly limits the liability of school personnel performing the former, see 
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.914, but not the latter. This distinction, how-
ever, bears no relation to whether CIC is a "related service." The intro-
duction of handicapped children into a school creates numerous new pos-
- -
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in attempting to extend special services to handicapped chil-
dp~n, were unwilling to guarantee them services of a kind 
that are routinely provided to the nonhandicapped. 
To keep in perspective the obligation to provide services 
that relate to both the health and educational needs of handi-
capped students, we note several limitations that should min-
imize the burden etitioner fears. ~ Eo be entitled to re-
lated services, a child must e handicapped so as to require 
special education. ' See 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1); 34 CFR § 300.5 
(1983). In the absence of a handicap that requires special 
education, the need for what otherwise might qualify as a re-
lated service does not create an obligation under the Act. 
See 34 CFR § 300.14 Comment (1) (1983). 
~ only those services necessary to aid a handicapped 
child to benefit from special education must be provided, re-
gardless how easily a school nurse or layperson could furnish 
them. For example, if a particular medication or treatment 
may appropriately be administered to a handicapped child 
o her than during the school day, a school is not required to 
provide nursing services to administer it. 
~ the regulations state that school nursing services 
must be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or 
other qualified person, not if they must be performed by a 
physician. See 34 CFR §§ 300.13(a), (b)(4), (b)(lO) (1983). 
It bears mentioning that here not even the services of a_nurse 
ar~ reguir,ed; as is conceded, a Tayperson with minimal train-
ing is qualified to provide CIC. See also, e.g., Department 
of Education v. Katherine D., 727 F. 2d 809 (CA9 1983). 
sibilities for injury and liability. Many of these risks are more serious 
than that posed by CIC, which the courts below found is a safe procedure 
even when performed by a nine-year-old girl. Congress assumed that 
states receiving the generous grants under the Act were up to the job of 
managing these new risks. Whether petitioner decides to purchase more 
liability insurance or to persuade the &ate to extend the limitation on li- I . e · 
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Finally, we note that respondents are not asking petitioner 
to provide equipment that Amber needs for CIC. Tr. of 
Oral Argument 18. They seek only the services of a qualified 
person. A school's obligation may be quite limited with re-
spect to health-related equipment needed by children even 
when they are not in school. 
We conclude that provision of CIC to Amber is not subject 
to exclusion as a "medical service" under the Act, and we af-
9 firm the Court of A peals' holdin th t CIC is a "related 1'2-.- ~ 
service" un er the Education of the Handicapped Act. 13 1 ~ > 
III 
Respondents sought relief not only under the Education of 
the Handicapped Act but under § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act as well. After finding petitioner liable to provide CIC 
under the former, the District Court proceeded to hold that 
petitioner was similarly liable under § 504 and that respond-
ents were therefore entitled to attorney's fees under § 505 of 
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S. C. §794a. We hold today, 
in Smith v. Robinson, -- U. S. -- (1984), that § 504 is 
inap~lief is available under the Education of 
the Handicapped Act to remedy a denial of educational serv-
ices. Respondents are therefore not entitled to relief under 
§ 504, and we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that re-
spondents are entitled to recover attorney's fees. In all 
18 We need not address respondents' claim that CIC, in addition to being 
a "related service," is a "supplementary ai[d] or servic[e]" that petitioner 
must provide to enable Amber to attend classes with nonhandicapped stu-
dents under the Act's "mainstreaming" directive. See 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1412(5)(B). Respondents have not sought an order prohibiting petitioner 
from educating Amber with handicapped children alone. Indeed, any re-
quest for such an order might not present a live controversy. Amber's 
present individual education program provides for regular public school 
classes with nonhandicapped children. And petitioner has admitted that it 
would be far more costly to pay for Amber's instruction and CIC services 
at a private school, or to arrange for home tutoring, than to provide CIC at 
the regular public school placement provided in her current individual edu-
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other respects, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
- -
May 24 , 1984 
83- 558 Irving Independent School District v . Tatro 
Dear Chief: 
Please joi,n me . 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc : The Conference 
Sincerely, 
e I 
~ttprtmt QJqm-t qf tqt ~tb ~Wt• 
-u!pngton. ~- QJ. 21lp'l, ✓ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
May 24, 1984 
Re: No. 83-558 Irving Independent School District v. Tatro 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMl!IERS or 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, No. 83-558 
Dear John: 
Your partial dissent prompts me to respond informally rather . 
than in the Court's opinion . 
The Court of Appeals found petitioner liable under the 
Education of the Handicapped Act and the Rehabilitation Act. We 
granted certiorari to review both holdings. Question 3 in the 
petition for certiorari asked, inter alia, whether the Court of 
Appeals' finding of liability under the Rehabilitation Act 
conflicted with our holding in Southeastern Community Colle ge v. 
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Contrary to your suggestion, there 
is no reason to think that this plain language contained an 
implicit qualification that the issue of liability under the 
Rehabilitation Act should not be reached if nothing but the 
$27,000 attorney's fee award turned on the answer. The questions 
presented were drafted by petitioner, who surely intended no such 
qualification. 
The petition makes this clear when it asserts that the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals violated Davis and two 
other cases in "determining that medical treatment is a related 
service and that failure to provide same violated both the EAHCA 
and the Rehabilitation Act and [in] awarding attorneys' fees 
under§ 504." Pet. for Cert. 13 (emphasis added). Squarely 
presented with the question of petitioner's liability under the 
Rehabilitation Act as interpreted by Davis, we answer that 
question with reference to our holding in Smith v. Robinson, 
U.S. (1984). 
The Rehabilitation Act issue is also presented by question 2 
in the certiorari petition in this case, which asks whether 
petitioner was liable to provide CIC under the Education of the 
Handicapped Act or the Rehabilitation Act. You believe that the 
question is not fairl¥ read to imply the phrase "or both," but I 
think this is a grudging reading of the question presented. 
Petitioner's position all along has been that it is obliged to 
provide CIC under neither statute. For the reasons just stated, 
I am still persuaded that petitioner s o ught the Court to review 
its liability under the Rehabilitation Act (and consequent 
liability for attorney's fees) even if the Court found it liable 






If this does not persuade you, I'll write it into the 
opinion. 
Regiards, , ,/ 
UJZzU CT' 
Justice Stevens 
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CHAMl!!5ERS O~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 25, 1984 
Re: 83-558 - Irvinq Independent School 
District v. Tatro 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your letter responding to my concern that 
you have written the opinion more broadly than necessary. 
Let me first digress by recalling the conversation that you, 
Lewis, and I had at lunch yesterday concerning the Grove 
City case. You will recall that I wrote separately in that 
case taking the position that the case could be decided in 
favor of the Government without delivering an advisory 
opinion on the controversial issue in the case. ~he Court 
nevertheless went forward and rendered an opinion which has 
invited a congressional reaction that will increase the 
business of judges. I really think Grove City is a good 
example of a "self-inflicted wound." 
I do not suggest that the same potential for an 
excessive legislative reaction inheres in this case. I do 
believe, however, that by going farther than necessary to 
make sure that this handicapped child's family must pay its 
own attorney's fees very likely wiJl produce a legislative 
reaction that will include an attorney's fee provision in 
the EAHCA as welJ as the Rehabilitation Act. Your letter 
puts forward a legitimate justification for the position you 
take, but it still does not persuade me that it is necessary 
to reach out to impose the fee obligation on the handicapped 
family. In other words, I am still. persuaded that we should 
adhere to the practice, whenever it is legitimate to do so, 
to write our opinions as narrowly as possible. 
I appreciate your taking the time to write to me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice JL 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-
~npttmt<!)'.curlcf~t1futltth~hdtg 
'cJlru;lpnghm. ~. <!):. 20.?~~ 
May 25, 1984 
-
Re: Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 
No. 83-558 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in Parts I & II of your opinion. I will 
await the writings in Smith v. Robinson before deciding what 
action to take with regard to Part III. 
Sincerely, 
(\ l 
- --\ -\.. 
WJB, Jr. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of" 
- -
,jn.vrtntt <!foud d lltt ~Utb ,jtatt.tr 
Jl~Jtutgton, ~- QI. 2.ll?'!~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
June 4, 1984 
Re: No. 83-558 Irving Independent School 
District v. Tatro 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
5~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
!'up-rtmt QJonrt .of tltt 'Jnitttt !'tau• 
Jfu~ J. QJ. 2ll.;i'1, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 5, 1984 
Re: 83-558 - Irving Independent School 
District v. Tatro 
Dear Chief, 
✓ 
I join Parts I and II and will join 
Part III if I join Harry in Smith v. 
Robinson, which I expect to do. 
Sincerely yours, 
~~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
-
~u.vumt <!}curl itf t~t ~ttittb .§htug 
jht¼lfyittgfon. ,. <!J. 2llp'!-.;J 
-
June 1 3 ✓ 1984 
Re: No. 83-558, Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro 
Dear Chief: 
I can give you a Charlie Whittaker "graveyard dissent" 
and join your opinion. I would be a lot more comfortable, 
however, if footnote 14 were just omitted. I say this 
because I think it is unnecessary and serves to detract from 
your opinion. 
You cite Smith v. Robinson on pages 11 and 13, so this 
case will have to be held for that one . You have not voted 
in Smith v. Robinson, however. 
The Chief Justice 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.inprtntt <l}onrl of tltt J:itltt~ .Staitg 
Jfaslp:nght~ lJ. <!}. 2llp.l!' 
June 15, 1984 
Re: 83-558 - Irving Independent School District v. Tatro 
Dear Harry: 
Thanks for your note of June 13. 
Note 14 has se r ved its purpose for some who have 
joined and I am glad to delete it. I don't like long 
notes but it had a purpose. 
I will hold off on Smith v. Robinson and maybe this 
case will not be ready until Smith is ready; I will focus 
on that case. 
Justice Blackmun 
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/ CHAMBERS OF" JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 28, 1984 
Re: No. 83-558-Irving Independent School 
District v. Tatro 
Dear Bill: 
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